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ABSTRACT 
For centuries, children have been used in times of war—serving as porters, cooks, spies, 
sex slaves, and soldiers. Unfortunately, this phenomenon is still pervasive today with an 
estimated 300,000 children involved in armed conflict as of 2015. This applied project 
examines a possible method for preventing the illegal practice of using children in 
combat by employing a new technology centered on community-based early warning 
theories. I seek to understand if implementing a text-based, mobile crowdsourcing 
platform in remote communities in Sub-Saharan Africa will be successful in predicting 
Lord’s Resistance Army raids, thereby reducing the number of children abducted and/or 
forcibly recruited. By harnessing the power of mobile phone technology in conflict 
prevention, communities and individuals become empowered to protect themselves 
against an attack rather than relying solely on external interventions. If this program is 
successful, it could be scaled and replicated to prevent other human rights abuses from 
occurring across the world. 
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1. INTRODUCTION & STUDY SETTING 
 
“My squad is my family, my gun is my provider, and protector, and my 
rule is to kill or be killed.” 
– Ishmael Beah,  
Former child soldier and author of  
“A Long Way Gone: Memories of a Boy Solider” 
 
 
“It may seem unimaginable to you that child soldiers exist and yet the     
reality for many rebel and gang leaders, and even state governments, is       
that there is no more complete end-to-end weapon system in the 
inventory      of war machines than the child soldier. Man has created 
the ultimate cheap, expendable, yet sophisticated human weapon at the 
expense of humanity's   own future: its children.” 
– Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire 
Founder of Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative and former  
Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Rwanda 
 
 
In 2011, I was fortunate enough to spend a few weeks in a refugee camp in 
northwestern Uganda. Even with all of the amenities my gracious hosts had to offer me, 
life in the camp was difficult. While I was offered lodging in a shelter built out of 
concrete, most of the homes occupied by the camp’s some 38,000 residents were 
constructed out of mud and metal sheets collected from food drop containers. The 
villagers I lived with walked two hours a day to harvest rice from their plots of land. The 
process of harvesting the rice by hand is a grueling endeavor—one I can personally 
testify to. And there were many days that we went thirsty due to a lack of rainfall.  
Most of the refugees in this particular settlement fled from neighboring 
Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997 to escape the violence that erupted during the 
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second civil war; and even though life in the camp was not easy, every person I spoke 
with was grateful for the chance at a life free from the bloodshed they experienced back 
home. The people with whom I stayed were eager to share their tales of horror and 
describe what they had witnessed as they ran for their lives across the border more than a 
decade earlier. Night after night, I lived vicariously through my new friends’ stories as 
they described in great detail the unspeakable violence they endured as children—an 
experience so impactful, it lingers with me today as though I had lived it myself.  
As these narratives unfolded throughout the weeks, I noticed that most of the 
anecdotes I heard had one common and very disturbing theme: children being used as 
weapons of war. Although I had heard of the term ‘child soldier’ before, I had not 
realized the extent of the brutality involved in all aspects of children in armed conflict. I 
heard stories of brothers and sisters being forced to mutilate, maim, or even kill their own 
family members before being inducted into a guerilla armed group. I was told that 
abductions were commonplace during this time and many people claimed they were 
‘lucky’ to have narrowly escaped the clutches of militia members as they raided village 
after village in search of children to capture. 
The compassion I felt for my kind and generous hosts transformed into a deep 
desire to do anything I could do to prevent children from enduring the trauma of being 
involved in armed conflict in the future. The following applied project stands as the 
culminating result of years-long research and the tangible product of my promise to do 
what I could do to prevent the horrors that my friends in Uganda lived through from ever 
happening again. It is my hope that this project will inspire other child advocates to 
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search for innovative and ambitious approaches to protect future generations from 
enduring this inconceivable trauma.   
1. a. Scope of Issue - Children in Armed Conflict 
The use of children in armed conflict is not a new phenomenon; children have 
been involved in military campaigns and armed militia groups for centuries, “as rat-
catchers on warships, or as drummer boys on the battlefields of Europe.”1 Even the word 
‘infantry,’ for foot-soldiers, can also mean a group of young people.2 However, since the 
1970s, the use of children in conflict has grown tremendously with the proliferation of 
light weapons. These ‘small arms’ are “revolvers and self-loading pistols; rifles and 
carbines; submachine guns; assault rifles; and light machine guns” which make even very 
small children as efficient a combatant as their adult counterparts.3 Such lightweight 
assault rifles, most notably the AK-47, allow armed groups the ability to exploit children 
in ways that were previously impossible. These children are now able to wield weapons 
of their own, making them very effective war machines for guerilla groups and militias.  
The growing prevalence of these type of weapons, known as ‘small arms,’ in 
conflict areas around the world increased the number of children forcibly recruited to 
take part in direct hostilities. According to a 2006 statistic, children were present in 40 
percent of the world’s “armed forces, rebel groups, and terrorist organizations” and 
                                                 
1. "Children In War: The State Of The World's Children", Unicef.Org, 1996, 
https://www.unicef.org/sowc96/2csoldrs.htm. 
2. Ibid. 
3. "UN Secretary-General Report On Small Arms", Un.Org, 1997, 
http://www.un.org/depts/ddar/Firstcom/SGreport52/a52298.html. 
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fought in “almost 75 percent of the world’s conflicts.”4 As of 2015, an estimated 300,000 
children were thought to have taken part in armed combat—but not necessarily as 
soldiers.5 Although though the proliferation of small arms enabled the use of children as 
soldiers, children were and continue to be exploited in combat in a myriad of other ways. 
In parts of East and Central Africa, for instance, an armed opposition group called the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has made worldwide headlines for their systematic 
abduction of children from homes, schools, and communities where they are “tortured, 
threatened, and sexually abused.”6 These child victims are forced to commit unspeakable 
atrocities such as killing their own parents or maiming family members as a way to 
initiate them into the group. And the latest reports suggest that the LRA has “now turned 
to selling abducted children into slavery in exchange for arms.”7 Since not all children 
forcefully recruited will be made into soldiers or even hold a gun during their time in 
captivity, contrary to what may be commonly believed, it is important to understand how 
children in combat are legally defined in the global landscape.  
 
 
 
                                                 
4. Peter Singer, The Enablers Of War: Causal Factors Behind The Child Soldier 
Phenomenon, 1st ed. (repr., Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010). 
5. "Child Soldiers Around The World", Council On Foreign Relations, 2017, 
http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/child-soldiers-around-world/p9331. 
6. "The Use Of Children As Soldiers In Africa Report: A Country Analysis Of 
Child Recruitment And Participation In Armed Conflict", Reliefweb.Int, 2011, 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/C157333FCA91F573C1256C1300
33E448-chilsold.htm. 
7. Ibid. 
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1. b. Defining ‘Children in Armed Conflict’ 
There is a legal, international consensus that a ‘child’ is defined as “a person 
under the age of 18, unless national laws mandate an earlier age of majority.”8 Although 
this international law clearly describes the parameters of a ‘child,’ one major area of 
contention among scholars and lawmakers alike concerns the definition of what 
constitutes a ‘soldier.’ The term ‘child soldier’ can refer to many aspects of children’s 
involvement in armed conflict. These youths do not have to be explicitly engaged in 
armed hostility to be considered a ‘child soldier.’ They can work as porters, messengers, 
cooks, or sex slaves (aka ‘bush wives’) to other soldiers.9 For the purposes of my 
research, I will use the broader term of ‘children in armed conflict’ or CAC, which is 
consistent with the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 2007 Principles Relating To The Status Of 
National Institutions, otherwise known as the ‘Paris Principles’. The Paris Principle 
guidelines on children associated with armed forces or groups considers the term to be 
equivalent to the following description: 
                                                 
8. "Convention On The Rights Of The Child", Ohchr.Org, accessed 6 April 2017, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CRC.aspx. 
9. Jens Christopher Andvig and Scott Gates, "Recruiting Children For Armed 
Conflict", in Child Soldiers In The Age Of Fractured States, 1st ed. (repr., Pittsburg: 
University of Pittsburg Press, 2009), 77-92; Rachel Brett and Margaret 
McCallin, Children: The Invisible Soldiers, 1st ed. (repr., Stockholm: Save the Children, 
Sweden (Rädda barnen), 1998); "Child Recruitment And Use | United Nations Office Of 
The Special Representative Of The Secretary-General For Children And Armed 
Conflict", United Nations Office Of The Special Representative Of The Secretary-
General For Children And Armed Conflict, 2017, 
https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/effects-of-conflict/six-grave-violations/child-
soldiers/; Scott Gates and Simon Reich, Child Soldiers In The Age Of Fractured States, 
1st ed. (repr., Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010). 
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‘A child associated with an armed force or armed group’ refers to any 
person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by 
an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited 
to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, 
spies or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taking 
or has taken a direct part in hostilities.10 
 
These guidelines are very helpful in elucidating which persons are compulsorily entitled 
to protections under international law and those who are eligible for convictions, 
sentencing, and criminal charges for engaging in armed warfare against civilians or non-
military combatants. But most importantly, this definition expands the concept of a ‘child 
soldier’ to include the numerous other roles children fall prey to during a conflict, which 
is extremely useful in understanding the nature of child exploitation in times of conflict. 
This definition has also been useful for lawmakers in the creation of legislation 
attempting to prohibit this practice.     
Over the past 40 years, significant headway has been made in the codification of 
laws protecting children from conflict exploitation. Despite the advances made to 
criminalize the practice however, there have been difficulties in the enforcement of these 
laws at the domestic level for several reasons. Primarily, children are abducted by militia 
groups through pre-planned raids.11 It has been well-documented that children are taken 
from their homes or school by armed groups seeking to benefit from adolescent 
manipulability.12 These groups operate outside the law and are often difficult or near 
                                                 
10. "Principles Relating To The Status Of National Institutions (Paris Principles)", 
Ohchr.Org, accessed 16 April 2017, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/StatusOfNationalInstitutions.aspx. 
10. T. W. Bennett, "Using Children In Armed Conflict: A Legitimate African 
Tradition? Criminalising The Recruitment Of Child Soldiers", ACT Initiates Actions 
Against Abuse Of Children In Armed Conflict In Africa, 1998. 
12. Ibid. 
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impossible to stop by local law enforcement due to varying factors such as poor 
governance, a lack of infrastructure, and limited security resources.13 Amnesty 
International campaigner, Andrew Philip, remarks also that commanders of militia groups 
that use children “…know it's a war crime, but they seem to believe they'll never be 
brought to justice. There is a sense of rampant impunity."14 Alongside a sense of 
impunity, the social dislocations of war involving the separation of families and 
economic hardships can also leave children vulnerable to abduction.  
Not all children in combat, however, are physically abducted and forced to join. 
Often times children are coerced into joining state military groups or armed militias for a 
variety of reasons including financial compensation from governments—seeing it as the 
only way to survive in times of conflict—or as a means of obtaining honor as soldiers are 
often revered in local communities.15 Also, a significant lack of birth registration or age 
verification documents in certain areas of the world can make legal enlistment difficult or 
even impossible. The unique challenges that arise from child engagement in armed 
conflict are highlighted by author T. W. Bennett:  
Whether children enlisted of their own free will or were forcibly 
conscripted, their involvement in armed conflict presents quite obvious 
dangers. Not only are young people ill-equipped to cope with the physical 
dangers they encounter, but their immaturity poses an additional threat to 
the safety of other combatants. Although less obvious, the long-term social 
consequences are possibly even more harmful.16 
 
                                                 
13. Alcinda Honwana, Child Soldiers In Africa, 1st ed. (repr., Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011). 
14. Carroll Rory, "Sham Demobilisation Hides Rise In Congo's Child 
Armies", The Guardian, 2003, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/sep/09/congo.rorycarroll. 
15. Bennett, "Using Children In Armed Conflict," 22. 
16. Ibid., 1-2. 
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The consequences of child involvement in hostilities present a growing global concern 
for all parties involved. Several scholarly works have focused on the societal 
consequences that CAC have on local communities as well as the radiating negative 
impacts of this practice to the economic status countries in which CAC are present.17 A 
University of Sussex study, for example, found that Ugandan ex-CAC had hindered long-
term economic performance due to a loss in years in education and schooling.18 This had 
tremendous negative impacts on their employability and contributed to Uganda’s low 
employment rates. The obvious and not-so-obvious implications of involving children in 
armed conflict have gained the attention of people around the world who wish to see this 
practice abolished once and for all.  
Despite the numerous legal mechanisms at the international, regional, and 
domestic levels directly prohibiting it, the practice of abusing children by making them 
take part in violent conflict is just as pervasive today as it was centuries ago. It is with 
this understanding that I seek to explore practical and effective methodologies of ending 
the exploitation of children in times of conflict and proffer a potential solution.  
1. c. Research Question 
 My research explores past and current methods of ending the forcible recruitment 
of children into armed conflict in Africa. I chose to focus my research on initiatives in 
                                                 
17. Andvig and Gates, "Recruiting Children For Armed Conflict," 77-92; K. 
Barstad, "Preventing The Recruitment Of Child Soldiers: The ICRC Approach", Refugee 
Survey Quarterly 27, no. 4 (2008): 142-149, doi:10.1093/rsq/hdn056; Gates and 
Reich, Child Soldiers In The Age Of Fractured States; Singer, The Enablers Of War. 
18. Christopher Blattman and Jeannie Annan, "The Consequences Of Child 
Soldiering", Review Of Economics And Statistics 92, no. 4 (2010): 882-898, 
doi:10.1162/rest_a_00036. 
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Africa because 40 percent of all children involved in armed combat live in African 
countries and the continent is known as the “epicenter” for children in conflict.19 (While 
the focus of my work is centered on Africa, it is my hope that the results will be 
transferrable to other areas as well.) 
With this in mind, I seek to understand which prevention measures have been most 
successful in reducing the number of children recruited into armed conflict. Even though 
there has been notable success in rehabilitation programs for former children in armed 
conflict, these methods only seek to heal the wounds previously inflicted.20 I am more 
concerned with practical solutions that could lead to more systemic changes versus 
relying on current methods that focus primarily on rehabilitation and reintegration after 
children have been released from their captors. By preventing the child from ever 
enduring the atrocities committed during captivity, it would bypass the child’s suffering 
from ever occurring and thereby end the need for trauma healing programs.  
 With this in mind, I have created an applied project that takes into consideration 
the scholarly research on the phenomenon of CAC, burgeoning theories that technology 
is an amplifier of conflict prevention, and real-world case studies that demonstrate the 
effectiveness of these technological approaches. This research builds on recently 
developed technological applications for conflict prevention and I believe it has the 
potential to bring about positive outcomes if it were to be deployed. The following 
                                                 
19. Vera Achvarina and Simon Reich, "No Place To Hide: Refugees, Displaced 
Persons, And Child Soldier Recruits", in Child Soldiers In The Age Of Fractured States, 
1st ed. (repr., Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010), 56. 
20. "Healing Child Soldiers", Bulletin Of The World Health Organization 87, no. 
5 (2009): 330-331, doi:10.2471/blt.09.020509. 
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section outlines the proposed application and summarizes the guiding principles that 
should allow it to achieve the goal of eradicating the use of children in armed conflict.   
1. d. Project Overview 
The organization Invisible Children created an Early Warning System that utilizes 
satellite phones and radios to communicate and track the whereabouts of the armed 
militia group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The LRA is a violent armed group that 
is often responsible for mass killings, torture, and is well-known for mass abductions of 
children to serve in their infantry.21 This warning system was developed in 2011 and has 
been successful in disseminating life-saving information about when village raids may 
occur. This project has been hailed as “by far the most accurate, up-to-date, and 
comprehensive source of information on LRA atrocities, which the partners hope will 
improve efforts to protect vulnerable communities in the region.”22 According to 
Invisible Children’s 2016 Midyear Security Brief, the team’s regular crisis reports 
have generated years of solid historical and real-time data, which has been helpful in 
predicting LRA raids and protecting communities.23 The brief, however, also 
underscored an urgent need to “strengthen and expand the Early Warning Network 
include remote communities that are not currently able to access or share information on 
LRA activity but who remain affected by LRA violence” in order to successfully end 
                                                 
21. P. W. Singer, "Talk Is Cheap: Getting Serious About Preventing Child 
Soldiers", Cornell International Law Journal 32, no. 20 (2004): p. 572, 
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol32/iss3/20. 
22. Patrick Meier, "Crisis Mapping: How Invisible Children's Kony 2012 
Campaign Changed Advocacy", CS Monitor, 2012, 
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2012/0309/Crisis-mapping-
How-Invisible-Children-s-Kony-2012-campaign-changed-advocacy. 
23. Ibid. 
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LRA violence.24 For that reason, I have chosen to focus on increasing the efficiency of 
this program through the use of SMS text messaging. 
In the past few years there have been remarkable strides made toward combatting 
violence, corruption, and threats of natural disasters in developing countries via the 
collection of data through text messaging.25 In 2014, the United Nations Development 
Programme partnered with Australian telecom MobiMedia to develop a SMS-based 
reporting system that allows citizens in Papua New Guinea to anonymously monitor 
corruption in their Department of Finance. This system, dubbed Phones Against 
Corruption, utilizes the power of crowdsourcing in rural areas to expose and combat 
political corruption.26 The interactive SMS system is free of charge for users, anonymous, 
simple to use on any basic mobile phone device, and does not require the internet. This 
innovative approach has helped the Papua New Guinean government reduce the 
corruption that was once rampant.  
It is based on this technological method that I have created a mobile phone 
crowdsourcing platform with the purpose of preventing forced recruitment and abduction 
of children captured in LRA raids. It is called the AuCourant Early Warning Network. I 
chose this name for two reasons. First, the term ‘au courant’ is a French expression 
meaning ‘well informed.’ It is important that the name is in French since it will be 
                                                 
24. Ibid. 
25. Anthony Bloome, "Mobile Technologies Helping To Fast Forward Quality 
Education | Archive - U.S. Agency For International Development", USAID.Gov, 2012, 
http://2012-2017.usaid.gov/news-information/frontlines/youth-mobile-
technology/mobile-technologies-helping-fast-forward-quality. 
26. "Phones Against Corruption - Observatory Of Public Sector Innovation", 
Oecd.Org, 2014, https://www.oecd.org/governance/observatory-public-sector-
innovation/innovations/page/phonesagainstcorruption.htm. 
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operating in countries where French is one of the national languages. Second, the name 
also connotes a current or flow of information, which will hopefully indicate to the user 
that they are contributing to a network of communities.  
         This interactive SMS platform will allow users in remote areas affected by the 
LRA (such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and the Central 
African Republic) to subscribe to AuCourant and submit anonymous information 
concerning the whereabouts of LRA militiamen. These users will be able to select their 
language, identify where the sighting occurred, and provide any other pertinent 
information that would help organizations such as Invisible Children to prevent potential 
attacks. Once deployed, this service will be able to send emergency notifications to all 
subscribed users when raids might occur in their area. 
         The reason Invisible Children did not initially integrate mobile phone technology 
into their early warning system is due to the fact that when it was established in 2011, 
there were only 18 million cell lines in the country of DRC.27 Essentially, there were not 
enough cell users in the country for this kind of integration to be effective and the 
infrastructure did not exist to support this kind of crowdsourced data. In 2014, however, 
mobile phone company Vodacom installed over 150 ultra-low cost cell towers through 
the DRC and over 40 in LRA-affected provinces.28  In 3 years, they more than doubled 
                                                 
27. "The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency", Cia.Gov, 2018, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html. 
28. United States Agency for International Development, "Cell Towers 
Strengthen Security In DRC" (repr., USAID, 2014), 
https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/cell-towers-strengthen-security-
drc. 
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the number of cell lines to 37.75 million and that number is expected to rise exponentially 
in the next five years.29 
         There are now enough mobile phone users to be able to provide consistent 
information to Invisible Children and, potentially, to other humanitarian organizations 
seeking to prevent child abductions. The platform is designed so that it is replicable, 
scalable, and translatable to other fields. It is my hope that this platform will be integrated 
with the Invisible Children early warning system to increase the efficiency and scope of 
the network so that more lives will be saved and more children will be spared from the 
horrors of forced recruitment. The subsequent chapters will outline the theories upon 
which this project has been built, how it will be implemented in the field, how it seeks to 
end the continued use of children in conflict.  
2. SYNOPSIS OF THE FIELD 
The research on the topic of children in armed conflict is extensive and spans 
many disciplines. For decades, scholars have attempted to understand the phenomenon of 
CAC through peer-reviewed publications such as journal articles and books. The 
proliferation of this literature is made possible with the accessibility of statistics 
published by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations, and 
reports distributed by state governments. Additionally, the news media has chronicled 
this practice in-depth and is an excellent source of information in the field where NGOs 
might be unable to reach.   
The main areas of research I will be focusing on for my applied project are 
international law and human rights, child recruitment and conscription in Africa, and 
                                                 
29. "The World Factbook”, Democratic Republic of Congo. 
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CAC prevention and intervention, and information communication technology for 
conflict preparedness and prevention. Within these fields, much research has been 
conducted on the reasons behind the use of children in armed conflict despite the legal 
mechanisms in place to protect them, the impetus for children to voluntarily join in 
violent hostilities, and recommendations for the rehabilitation and reintegration of former 
CACs and the prevention of this practice in whole.30 
The first step in approaching this research is understanding what it means to be a 
child involved in armed conflict, how they are classified and identified, and what roles 
these children often play in their forced or voluntary obligations. I will examine the role 
of international humanitarian law in defining and codifying laws concerning children 
since the human rights movement of the 1970s. I will then outline the research on CAC 
voluntary enlistment, the methods being recommended to remedy the inadequacies of 
laws concerning them, and the initiatives currently being studied in intervention and 
prevention methods.  
2. a. International Law on the Rights of the Child 
Significant headway has been made in the codification of laws protecting children 
from exploitation since the 1924 League of Nations Declaration on the Rights of the 
Child, which sparked the dialogue on the issue of the rights of children. Below is a 
snapshot of the some of the most monumental laws, conventions, and treaties that 
                                                 
30. Ilene Cohn, "A Call For State Action To Prevent The Recruitment And Use 
Of Children As Soldiers In State Armed Forces And State Allied Armed 
Groups", Journal Of Human Rights Practice 6, no. 1 (2014): 182-190, 
doi:10.1093/jhuman/hut029; Alpaslan Özerdem and Sukanya Podder, Child Soldiers: 
From Recruitment To Reintegration, 1st ed. (repr., Basingstoke [etc.]: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011). 
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followed after that landmark Declaration. This timeline illustrates how instrumental the 
Declaration was in terms of bringing about more attention to the rights of the child: 
• 1924 – League of Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child, 
• 1948 – United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
• 1949 – Geneva Conventions, 
• 1950 – European Convention on Human Rights,  
• 1951 – Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
• 1966 – United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights, 
• 1969 – American Convention on Human Rights, 
• 1977 – Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
• 1981 – African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
• 1984 – Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, 
• 1989 – United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and 
• 1990 – Organization on African Unity (OAU) African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child. 
 
 The next most important contribution to children’s rights was the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Adopted in 1990, the CRC is a 
foundational treaty that outlines provisions defending all children’s right to life, survival, 
and development. This Convention, which was ratified by all self-governing states apart 
from the United States, defines a child as “a person below the age of 18, unless the laws 
of a particular country set the legal age for adulthood younger.”31 The member states who 
ratified this Convention have an obligation to incorporate these guiding principles into 
their national legal structures and uphold the standards enumerated in the treaty by all 
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feasible measures.32 This landmark Convention paved the way for additional international 
treaties addressing more specific issues of child human rights abuses, such as CAC. 
Although the 2007 Paris Principles created a definition for children in armed 
conflict, the preceding Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(OPAC), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2000, specifically outlawed child 
involvement in armed conflict. With 130 signatories and 10 ratifications, this Convention 
proved to be instrumental in the protection of children from state military recruitment.33 
This treaty reaffirms children’s rights to special protections and condemns the “targeting 
of children in situations of armed conflict.”34 The treaty recognizes the uniquely harmful 
effects and long-term consequences of the recruitment and forceful conscription of CAC. 
The Convention emphasizes the vulnerable nature of children and the responsibility the 
global community has in safeguarding them from exploitation, particularly in times of 
conflict. Article 1 of the Optional Protocol obliges state parties to “take all feasible 
measures to ensure that members of their armed forces who have not attained the age of 
18 years do not take a direct part in hostilities.”35 Other Articles go on to prohibit the 
compulsory recruitment of persons under the age of 18, ban the use of children by non-
                                                 
32. Ibid. 
33. "Status Of Treaties: 11. B Optional Protocol To The Convention On The 
Rights Of The Child On The Involvement Of Children In Armed Conflict", 
Treaties.Un.Org, 2017, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11-
b&chapter=4&lang=en. 
34. "Optional Protocol To The Convention On The Rights Of The Child On The 
Involvement Of Children In Armed Conflict", Ohchr.Org, accessed 17 April 2017, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/OPACCRC.aspx. 
35. Ibid. 
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state actors and guerrilla forces, and compels ratifying governments to do everything in 
their power to uphold these provisions. 
The scope of these Conventions, however, is limited. The Conventions only have 
‘legal teeth’ in the states that have signed or ratified them. Also, the protections laid out 
in the Optional Protocol, for example, do not require a complete ban on the use of 
children since the wording “take all feasible measures” is not a total prohibition.36 
Additionally, the Protocol received other criticism from the International Committee of 
the Red Cross for the phrase “take part in direct hostilities,” which opens up the 
possibility that children could be involved indirectly in conflict as spies, porters, or 
helpers in other ways.37 These and other loopholes—coupled with exiguous 
ratifications—have allowed for the use of children in conflict, either by governmental 
armed forces or opposition militias, around the world. The shortcomings of these legal 
protections that are meant to prevent children from engaging in armed conflict are widely 
discussed in academic and governmental institutions alike with the goal of addressing the 
loopholes that facilitate abuse.38  
                                                 
36. "Treaties, States Parties, And Commentaries: Protocol Additional To The 
Geneva Conventions Of 12 August 1949, And Relating To The Protection Of Victims Of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977", Ihl-Databases.Icrc.Org, 
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750098?OpenDocument. 
37. Ibid. (emphasis added). 
38. Ilene Cohn and Guy Goodwin-Gill, Child Soldiers: The Role Of Children In 
Armed Conflicts, 1st ed. (repr., New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 1994). 
International Committee of the Red Cross, "ICRC Legal Protection Of Children In 
Armed Conflict", 2003, https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/1033/children-legal-
protection-factsheet.pdf; Peter W Singer, Children At War, 1st ed. (repr., Berkeley [u.a.]: 
University of California Press, 2009); Michael Wessells, "Child Soldiers, Peace 
Education, And Postconflict Reconstruction For Peace", Theory Into Practice44, no. 4 
(2005): 363-369, doi:10.1207/s15430421tip4404_10. 
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As of 2017, there are an estimated 230 million children currently living in areas 
affected by armed conflict, which puts them at great risk for being recruited or 
conscripted into these conflicts.39 And the Council on Foreign Relations estimated that 
300,000 children around the world are used as combatants today while nearly half a 
million additional children serve in armies not currently at war.40 However, the debate 
continues to rage on concerning how states are meant to implement domestic laws that 
adhere to international standards considering the government’s discretion in 
interpretation.41 This discretion allows the state to interpret and internalize international 
law provisions in a variety of cultural contexts, within a myriad of different legal 
traditions, and through the lens of various societal and historical conditions.42 How, and 
if, the state chooses to implement the provisions at the domestic level speaks to not only 
the legal systems but also the religious and cultural norms which shape perceptions of 
that society. 
                                                 
39. Volker Druba, "The Problem Of Child Soldiers", International Review Of 
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40. “Child Soldiers Around The World”. 
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International Law Review 47, no. 01 (2000): 27, doi:10.1017/s0165070x00000747. 
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This shifts the conversation from the topic of international law to one of 
understanding the factors, be they cultural or otherwise, which influence a child’s 
decision to enlist, an adult’s desire to exploit children, and the government’s role in either 
prosecutions or impunity of perpetrators. Since the promulgation of the international 
treaties and the widespread recognition of the human rights movement during the 1970s, 
scholars have attempted to explain and understand the factors allowing for the 
perpetuation of this practice.43 Now that the legal foundations and theoretical 
explanations concerning CAC have been elucidated, I will turn my examination to the 
causes perpetuating the continuation of this occurrence.   
2. b. Factors Perpetuating the Use of Children in Armed Conflict 
Scholars have sought to understand the reasons behind the perpetuation of the 
recruitment of CAC and why children might want to join of their own volition. These 
‘push and pull factors’ are responsible for influencing the decision of either adults to use 
children or of children to want to enlist themselves.44 As previously mentioned, the 
occurrence of children who voluntarily choose to take part in hostilities has remarkably 
been widely documented. This might seem unthinkable when one considers the danger 
and trauma associated combat. The children who are voluntarily opt in to leave their 
                                                 
43. David M. Rosen, "Child Soldiers, International Humanitarian Law, And The 
Globalization Of Childhood", American Anthropologist 109, no. 2 (2007): 296-306, 
doi:10.1525/a 
44. Andvig and Gates, "Recruiting Children For Armed Conflict," 77-92; Cohn 
and Goodwin-Gill, Child Soldiers; Wessells, "Child Soldiers, Peace Education, And 
Postconflict Reconstruction For Peace", 363-369. 
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homes and join are often drawn to engage due to the power, excitement, and glamour 
associated with armed guerilla groups and the military.45  
Additionally, children are often times compensated by state militaries for their 
voluntarily enlistment. Particularly in impoverished countries where opportunities for 
employment may be scarce, children may look to voluntary enlistment as a money-
generating (and potentially life-saving) opportunity. Author Peter Singer, explores the 
“socio-economic changes, technological developments, and the changing contexts of 
war” that present the channels for children to become engaged in armed conflict.46 In 
these ‘changing contexts of war,’ there is more economic instability and families must 
strive harder to make ends meet.47 It is in these situations that adults will either encourage 
their children to enlist for money or even hand them over to the state military. It has even 
been documented that rebel groups will recruit by flaunting the amount of money they are 
able to make once they join—thereby attracting adolescents who are eager to earn money 
and who may be lacking the necessary education or skills to obtain lawful employment.48  
Authors Vera Achvarina, Scott Gates, and Simon Reich also discuss the linkages 
between war and criminality in the context of civil wars and what can be done to remedy 
the lack of systematic analysis of this human security issue.49 They argue that the 
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47. Ibid. 
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problem of CAC is unlikely to resolve itself without the prescription of policy measures 
to mitigate civil conflicts and address the special needs of child in war zones.50 These 
studies reveal that the mechanisms for child recruitment are often linked to low a gross-
domestic product of a country and when coupled with advances in light weaponry, this 
leads to a higher proportion of child involvement.51 In these countries, children are seen 
as easy and cheap methods for armed forces to mobilize, which contributes to the 
worldwide proliferation of this practice—as of 2006, approximately 75 percent of 
conflicts in the world involve children.52 With statistics like that, it is clear to see that the 
issue of CAC spans multiple continents and is not—as it has been claimed— tied to a 
“cultural or historical thread…or a set of historical experiences.” The widespread 
prevalence of this occurrence has gained the worldwide attention of children’s rights 
advocates in a multitude of disciplines.  
2. c. Prevention & Intervention Methods 
NGOs and international civil society members have also contributed significantly 
to the global discussion on the best methods to eradicate the use of children and what 
policies could be implemented to stem the flow of violence in countries with a history of 
protracted armed conflict. Prominent organizations such as Invisible Children, Child 
Soldiers International, Watchlist, the International Committee for the Red Cross, 
UNICEF, and the Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative seek to eliminate the use of 
children in armed conflict through various programs such as training women in the 
security sector, providing recommendations to governments to criminalize any type of 
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recruitment or use of children in hostilities, campaigning for CAC awareness, and 
advocating for legislative legal reform. 
Research conducted by NGOs in recent years has drawn attention to the 
prevention of the use of children in armed conflict.53 This is the primary area of focus as 
it redirects the issue to the core of the problem: an ounce of prevention is worth a pound 
of cure. Many peer-reviewed articles, NGO reports, and child rights legislation offer 
suggestions for what they consider to be the best method for preventing the use of 
children in armed conflict. One of these methods include involving the security sector to 
train and prepare governmental militaries on what to do when and if they encounter 
underage fighters during battle.54 The Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative focuses on 
prevention by preparing the “military, police and peacekeepers to prevent the recruitment 
and use of child soldiers” in countries such as Sierra Leone, Uganda, and even Canada, 
by providing specialized training, tools, and resources.55 From the website, the Child 
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Soldiers Initiative has made an impact by leading the way on research by “addressing 
critical gaps in knowledge on child soldiers, pioneering work on child soldiers as an early 
warning indicator of mass atrocities, and creating the world’s first training handbook 
focused on child soldiers.”56 
Unlike the training approach employed by the Child Soldiers Initiative, other 
organizations recommend cutting to the core of the problem by increasing regional and 
national security, increasing opportunities for education, and reducing poverty in 
countries most afflicted by these practices.57 Organizations such as World Vision, 
Catholic Relief Services, and United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund 
(UNICEF) advocate for broader attempts to prevent conflict in areas with protracted 
violence with the intent of reducing the need for child recruitment and abduction. While 
these organizations may have specific programs that address the child victims of this 
violence, those programs are typically geared toward disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration of former child soldiers rather than pursuing a goal of prevention.58 Since I 
am most interested in prevention, I will now explore the most effective systems that have 
been introduced to prevent children from becoming involved in armed conflict and how 
these methodologies could be improved with technology.  
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2. c. i. Community-Based Prevention Initiatives 
Although organizations dedicated to reducing the number of CAC are becoming 
increasingly innovative in their methods, these programs often fail to recognize the 
agency of the community members where these crimes are taking place. These programs 
are reliant on involvement from lawmakers, security sector actors, government officials, 
combatants, and civil society members for the most part; rarely is there a focus or even 
mention of the role of the citizens living in high-risk areas and what they can do to 
prevent their children from engaging in armed conflict. Be they the relatives of the 
abducted children, witnesses of the raids, or community members living in areas where 
these acts take place, I believe these individuals possess the missing key to addressing 
this issue: first-hand information.  
Although the previously mentioned prevention programs may see some success 
with their methods, there have been recent studies that show the effectiveness of more 
community-based methodology that focus on acquiring information from citizens versus 
relying on data acquired through trained ‘outsiders’ (i.e. NGO workers and government 
officials).59 The empowered effect that the individuals feel when they are able to 
contribute to the safety of their community has been linked to “ensuring the sustainability 
of the systems” and “reduc[ing] their vulnerability” in the face of violence.60  
Recommendations from Ruth Kahurananga, Child Rights Adviser for World 
Vision International, also point to the growing need for community involvement in CAC 
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prevention. In an address to the 4th World Congress on Family Law and Child Rights in 
2005, Kahurananga argues for the following changes to be made in order to achieve 
higher success rates in prevention programs: 
• the empowerment of national citizens;  
• participation in decision making and drafting of resolutions by national citizens;   
• collaboration in the design, implementation, monitoring and reporting 
mechanisms for strategies dealing with CAC; and 
• mobilisation of resources and capacity building in understanding international 
humanitarian and human rights law relating to children61 
 
An evaluation and needs assessment conducted by USAID concerning the 
prevention of LRA child abductions also mirrors Kahurananga’s theory by 
recommending “strengthening community-based protection systems” by “bridging the 
gaps in communication between LRA-affected communities, local authorities, 
humanitarian agencies and the military.”62 Unfortunately, the growing need for more 
community-based participation in the effort to quell the CAC epidemic is not without its 
share of logistical barriers. Since it has been argued that in order for prevention to be 
more effective, locals should contribute their knowledge about how to solve the issue—
but how?  
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2. c. ii. Crowdsourcing Information 
Given this context, it is easier to understand why gathering local knowledge is 
extremely helpful, but it is also difficult to acquire; not only area these areas dangerous to 
enter, but they are also remarkably ‘cut-off’ from the organizations trying to help them 
due to the terrain and lack of infrastructure.63 It is often problematic to communicate with 
villages that do not have paved roads for travelling to and from, as well as areas that are 
too entrenched in conflict that prevent NGO workers from visiting. These barriers, 
physical and bureaucratic, present challenges for those advocates and researchers who are 
trying to enter these spaces to collect data that could help understand the conflict and 
prevent abductions. 
As outlined previously (see Section 2.c.), the methods employed by NGOs to 
address child abductions by the LRA have seen moderate success. However, there have 
been promising results from the use of technology to increase communication between 
the citizens and the agencies seeking to protect them from harm.64 The introduction of 
mobile phones to “crowdsource” information has been theorized to reduce protracted 
violence in remote areas of the world.65 ‘Crowdsourcing’ is “a method of data collection 
that draws on voluntary contributions from an unbounded crowd to determine answers to 
questions” and is generally done “through mobile phones using text-based polls and 
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surveys (but can really be done in any way that allows a public audience to provide 
feedback to a question.)”66 Conflict analysis scholar, Charles Martin-Shields, studies the 
effects that mobile crowdsourcing has on conflict prevention and management in 
developing countries. Since mobile phone use is becoming increasingly common in 
developing countries, Martin-Shields theorizes that mobile phones are able to play a key 
role in violence prevention because data and information can be gathered efficiently and 
quickly in ways that it never has been in the past.67 
Crowdsourced information can assist in the goal of CAC prevention for a variety 
of reasons. Foremost, the organizations trying to bring aid and assistance to the conflict 
areas will be able to communicate with them and gather valuable information such as 
details about LRA hideouts, reports of attacks and/or killings, and LRA sightings. These 
communities, which were once closed off from contact with areas outside their 
immediate surroundings, would be able to transmit their local knowledge of the activities 
of the LRA militia group and pass along information that might prove to be helpful for 
predicting where the next attack might take place. Another benefit to collecting 
crowdsourced data in these goes back to the theories concerning the benefits of 
community-based prevention methods. The citizens in LRA-affected areas could actively 
contribute to their own community and family safety through information sharing. They 
might also feel a sense of empowerment that would, as authors Macherera and Chimbaria 
argue, reduce their vulnerability to attack.68  
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Through mobile phone crowdsourcing, third-party actors such as NGOs and 
governments, can send and receive information to and from remotely located citizens in 
an effort to gather data, prevent violence, and foster peacebuilding. Information reported 
from crowdsourced methods flow from the ‘bottom-up,’ allowing the mobile phone user 
to send reports in real time to organizations located hundreds or thousands of miles away. 
Not only does the user act as a collector of data, but she also serves as an extension of the 
organization she is relaying the information to. She can be the proverbial ‘eyes and ears’ 
of people who cannot physically collect data in those areas. But crowdsourcing data is 
only one piece, albeit an important one, in the effort to prevent violence using 
technology. The flow of information must also be able to inject data back into the 
communities it seeks to serve. For example, in the case of CAC prevention, people could 
receive information about the next LRA attack and be able to evacuate before the attack 
occurs. This is where early warning systems come into play. These platforms allow a 
two-way communication flow that is necessary for predicting and avoiding clandestine 
militia attacks, a valuable tactic for communities plagued by LRA raids. 
2. c. iii. Early Warning Systems (EWS) 
In recent years, humanitarian organizations and governments have been 
partnering to address some of the world’s worst disasters through early warning systems. 
Many definitions of early warning systems exist, but according to the United Nations 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, early warning systems are “set[s] of 
capacities needed to generate and disseminate timely and meaningful warning 
information to enable individuals, communities and organizations threatened by a hazard 
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to prepare and act appropriately and in sufficient time to reduce the possibility of harm or 
loss.”69 
Although early warning systems can adapt and change to fit the need of the 
hazard presented, the most common systems tend to warn communities about natural 
disasters such as floods, hurricanes, tsunamis, earthquakes, and landslides while 
platforms that address communicable diseases and human conflict are very few.70 Of 
these platforms, the systems tend to employ a ‘community-based’ or ‘people-centered’ 
methodology whereby the affected communities participate in the development of the 
system by offering their local knowledge.71 Authors Macherera and Chimbari define 
community-based early warning systems as “one in which the communities participate in 
hazard identification and the formulation of the warning system, and not merely reacting 
to a warning at local level” thereby creating more opportunities to prevent violence by 
allowing locals to create evacuation protocols and security plans to avoid violence.72 This 
phenomenon suggests that two-way flows of communication are helpful in eradicating 
instances of human violence and brokering peace in remote regions. Drawing on this 
newly published research, I will begin to explore how early warning systems and 
community-based crowdsourcing can be used in tandem to potentially prevent child 
abductions in conflict areas.  
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The Third United Nations World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in 2015 
emphasized a more “people-centered prevention approach to disaster risk” and 
encouraged engagement with relevant stakeholders, including citizens, in order to 
successfully prepare for encroaching hazards.73 Here we see a shift in the narrative 
surrounding the role of locals. The decades-long rhetoric of villager victimhood is being 
replaced by language that suggests that they should engage as critical stakeholders in the 
fight against violence in their communities—within the confines of the law they “are 
agents of change and should be given the space and modalities to contribute to disaster 
risk reduction.”74 Community-based early warning systems are perfect modalities to 
engage oppressed or victimized actors because anyone with a phone, regardless of 
position, can contribute their knowledge and receive information about potential dangers. 
This empowers previously disenfranchised individuals to create change from within 
rather than waiting for outside forces to intervene.  
The community-based early warning systems are also helpful because they 
cultivate awareness, strengthen local capacities, and allow individuals to actively 
participate in reducing their vulnerability to hazards.75 Essentially, the platforms afforded 
by new technologies give agency to people and empower communities that were once 
powerless to stop the reign of terror. These systems are also gaining international 
attention as more monitoring and performance evaluations publish statistics marking the 
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increase in effectiveness of community-centered protection programs and early 
warning.76 Furthermore, advances in technology contribute to the success of these 
programs as they provide the tools necessary for this kind of two-way communication 
and collaboration.77 The following chapters will help to explain the context of violence 
within the affected communities to better understand the complexities associated with 
initiating community-based protection programs, how to best analyze the information 
collected from those individuals, and how to harness technology to hopefully bring about 
positive change. 
 
3. BACKGROUND & CONFLICT HISTORY 
3. a. Understanding the LRA Conflict 
Understanding the context in which the LRA conflict came about is extremely 
important in the analysis of humanitarian intervention and the prevention methods 
employed by stakeholders. As with many events in history, this conflict is multifaceted 
and complex. Over the LRA’s long regime of violence, they have been accused of a 
litany of human rights abuses such as: the mutilation and summary execution on non-
combatants, sexual slavery of women, the conscription of child soldiers, and other war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.78 The LRA became infamous for their violent forced 
recruitment of children after failing to fill their ranks with adults from the public. In some 
                                                 
76. USAID, "Performance Evaluation And Needs Assessment Report Of USAID 
Programming To Communities Affected By The Lord’s Resistance Army In Central 
Africa", 2. 
77. Ibid., 4. 
78 F. Van Acker, "Uganda And The Lord's Resistance Army: The New Order No 
One Ordered", African Affairs 103, no. 412 (2004): 335-357, doi:10.1093/afraf/adh044. 
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cases children were forced to kill their family members, hack off the limbs of captives, or 
for the girls, become the ‘bush wives’ of the commanders and engage in sex acts or 
domestic labor.79 Using “psychological warfare” tactics on children, including addicting 
them to a drug called brown-brown (a mix of cocaine and smokeless gunpowder), LRA 
soldiers were able to conscript 66,000 children in Uganda over the course of the war.80 
It has been estimated that by the end of 2003, 1,200,000 civilians were abducted 
from their homes and forcibly extricated to live in LRA camps.81 As tensions grew in the 
region and LRA incidents made their way into the headlines of newspapers around the 
world, global outraged spawned reaction from governments near and far. Tales of the 
tragedy being inflicted in northern Uganda caught the attention of world leaders including 
the U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan who coordinated U.N. efforts in an attempt to 
quell the violence.82 Pressure mounted on the militants as the U. S. State Department 
classified the LRA as a terrorist organization and passed the Northern Uganda Crisis 
Response Act to end the crisis.83 In 2006, feeling the rising pressure from the U.N. and 
the U.S. ground troops, the LRA retreated from Uganda into the safety of west 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) border region and Central African Republic 
(CAR) where they remain in hiding today.84 In these heavily forested areas, the LRA can 
                                                 
79. "The LRA Crisis | Basic History", The Resolve, 2010, 
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80. Ibid. 
81. Van Acker, "Uganda And The Lord's Resistance Army", 336. 
82. Paul Raffaele, "Uganda: The Horror", Smithsonianmag.com, 2005, 
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remain hidden by the vegetation which allows them to continue their operations while 
maintaining a low-profile. Even though their forces have reduced in numbers with the 
various efforts by the DRC and CAR militaries, the LRA continues to wreak havoc 
“against local communities on a regular basis” throughout these two regions.85 These 
areas are susceptible to LRA attacks due to weak or ineffectual governments, limited 
humanitarian presence, and rugged landscapes which easily conceal militia hideouts and 
camps.86 
The ethnic tensions spurred by years of oppression, brutality, torture, and murder 
of civilians under previously dictatorships, as well as economic instability, paved the way 
for this radical militia groups to form and flourish.87 The unique factors that allow this 
violence to persist in this area of Sub-Saharan Africa explain why some of the 
interventions have not been successful while others have, and how some current methods 
can be improved to build capacity with the aim of ending the violence. The following 
section provides a ‘real-world’ example of how one organization has brought these 
theories into practice in an effort to thwart LRA abductions in these regions.  
3. b. Invisible Children & the Kony Campaign 
Founded in 2004, Uganda-based NGO Invisible Children operates with the 
mission of eradicating the Kony-led LRA forces that continue to target communities in 
DRC and south CAR. With a focus on child protection in particular, Invisible Children 
                                                 
https://2012-2017.usaid.gov/central-africa-regional/fact-sheets/fact-sheet-counter-
lord%E2%80%99s-resistance-army-c-lra. 
85. Ibid. 
86. Ibid. 
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launched a global campaign dubbed ‘Kony 2012’ to inform the world about the horrific 
acts the LRA was inflicting upon children. The documentary went viral and people across 
the world stood united with Invisible Children’s mission to save children from the horrors 
of conscripted soldiering. According to their website, Invisible Children “mobilized 
unprecedented international awareness and action to help end the LRA crisis, contributed 
to a 93% reduction in killings by the LRA, and…have helped thousands of central 
African families become safer through innovative community-based protection 
initiatives.”88 Although these numbers cannot be corroborated with sources other than 
what is presented by the NGO themselves, the Kony campaign has been cited by the 
media as having, for example, a “profound impact on U.S. policy toward the LRA crisis, 
most notably the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act and the decision 
to send U.S. military advisers to the region to assist Ugandan military forces hunting for 
Kony.”89 It was also reported that Invisible Children’s mission coincided with “public 
policy priorities of the Obama administration (such as the prevention of mass atrocities 
and conflict prevention and regional security cooperation in Africa)” that lead to a closer 
collaboration between the U.S. government and the NGO.90 Whether or not the success of 
the Kony campaign can be verified in the field, it is evident that the national attention 
sparked by this viral movement directed more U.S. attention to the ongoing crisis and 
                                                 
88. "Our Story | Invisible Children", Invisible Children, 2014, 
https://invisiblechildren.com/our-story/. 
89. Kristof Titeca and Matthew Sebastian, "Why Did Invisible Children 
Dissolve?", Washington Post, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
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provided opportunities for the development of more innovative ways to combat the 
relentless attacks by the LRA.  
3. b. i. Invisible Children’s Community-based Protection Initiatives 
With cooperation with the U.S. government, Invisible Children launched several 
community-based protection initiatives after their Kony campaign to expand their reach 
into remote, LRA-affected communities. These included a ‘Come Home’ LRA Defection 
Messaging System, an LRA Crisis Tracker, and an Early Warning Radio Network. The 
‘Come Home’ program sends an FM broadcasted message to LRA soldiers encouraging 
them to leave the group and return home.91 The hope is that soldiers will understand that 
there are more options than continuing the life they have been leading.  
Invisible Children also partnered with another NGO to establish the LRA Crisis 
Tracker, a crisis-mapping social web platform that broadcasts the attacks and other 
activities perpetrated by the LRA in near real time.92 This dynamic and publicly available 
mapping tool allows users to better understand the urgency of the LRA crisis and to what 
extent the group is affecting the local communities. The LRA Crisis Tracker uses 
information gathered from the UN, partner organizations, local NGOs, and first-hand 
reports captured by the Early Warning Radio Network.  
This Radio Network was Invisible Children’s response to the problem of 
inaccessibility and lack of communication with remote and isolated villages. The 
Network was designed to disrupt the patterns of violence by collecting first-hand 
information from trained Community Observers, vetting the information for accuracy, 
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and disseminating warnings concerning the location of the LRA using high-frequency 
(HF), long-range, two-way radios. Presently, there are 74 HF radios in 78 communities in 
the DRC and CAR that allow Community Observers to receive twice-daily security 
briefings about LRA activity, including potential life-saving information about the 
likelihood of a village raid.93 The information that the Community Observers are 
responsible for gathering and reporting are incidents such as “civilian death and injury, 
abduction, looting, displacement, and the release or escape of formerly abducted 
persons.”94 The hope with this community-based program is that the citizens in LRA-
affected areas will feel empowered to protect their families against potential raids or 
attacks. This idea is commensurate with the burgeoning theories on Information 
Communication Technology suggesting that tech-based humanitarian initiatives are more 
likely to prevent conflict if the citizens function as agents of change rather than merely 
the bystanders of atrocities committed around them.95 
Below I have highlighted some of the main issues with the current methods and 
proffered some potential solutions. 
 
CURRENT ISSUES:  
• The current method relies on High-Frequency radios, which is not efficient. The 
radios break often, need to be replaced, are expensive, and do not offer 
consistently clear transmissions so communication is difficult. 
                                                 
93. Ibid. 
94. Invisible Children + Resolve LRA Crisis Tracker Database, "LRA Crisis 
Tracker: MAP METHODOLOGY & DATABASE CODEBOOK V2a" (repr., 
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• The Community Observers are the only ones who can report on incidents and they 
have to be identified and trained which takes times and money. 
• The current network can only operate in certain (pre-selected) villages, leaving 
members of other communities to feel disempowered or forgotten. 
• Once the information is received from the Community Observer, he must relay 
the warning of encroaching danger to hundreds or even thousands of people, 
which can be difficult for just one person to achieve.  
 
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS: 
• Increase the accessibility to the network by opening communication through 
mobile phones, which many people own. 
• All people with a mobile phone can send and receive information so no 
community feels disempowered or forgotten. 
• The service is free to the user and anonymous, so they can feel safe reporting 
information. 
• Communities can create disaster response evacuation plans to prevent or reduce 
fatalities and child abductions. This gives the people themselves the ability to 
protect themselves  
versus relying on external assistance. 
The following section will further rationalize why I chose these solutions and explain 
how these changes might help to expand the scope of safety to villages afflicted by 
militia raids. 
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4. PROJECT METHODOLOGY & RATIONALE 
 
“Technology is nothing. What’s important is that you have a faith in 
people, that they’re basically good and smart, and if you give them 
tools, they’ll do wonderful things with them.”  
– Steve Jobs, 
Former Chairman, Chief Executive Officer,  
and Co-founder of Apple Inc. 
 
 
“We believe that if marginalized people are able to easily communicate 
to those who aim to serve them, then those organizations and 
governments can more effectively respond to their communities' 
immediate needs while simultaneously bringing global attention to 
their problems through the aggregation of their voices.” 
– Ushahidi mission statement, 
Open-source humanitarian software used for crisis response,  
human rights reporting, and election monitoring 
 
 
4. a. The AuCourant Early Warning Network 
 Founded in theories suggesting that community-based early warning systems are 
useful methods for preparing citizens to protect against violence, I developed a platform 
that increases the efficiency of Invisible Children’s Radio Early Warning Network by 
integrating SMS text messaging as a tool for data capture. My platform is named ‘Au 
Courant,’ which means ‘well informed’ in French, the national language of the DRC and 
CAR. This phrase can also mean ‘current,’ which connotes the flow of information that 
this platform hopes to achieve. I created this mobile phone crowdsourcing platform with 
the intent of improving some of problems posed by IC’s network which relies solely on 
communication from HF radios.  
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 The way the platform works is simple: it allows any mobile phone user in DRC or 
CAR to text a short code96 number if they spot LRA militia members or any militia-
related activity. As the platform is built using interactive SMS (iSMS) technology, the 
user will be able to have a text ‘conversation’ and pre-programmed messages will be 
automatically sent depending on the user’s responses. As soon as the first text is sent, the 
user will receive an automated response welcoming them to the network and asking for 
certain information to be included in the message such as where the sighting occurred, 
the time and date, and location of the incident. This information is similar to what the 
Invisible Children Community Observers are trained to capture and report. However, this 
method, unlike IC, is available to thousands more witnesses in these LRA-affected 
communities.  
 The AuCourant iSMS system is free of charge for users, anonymous, simple to 
use on any basic mobile phone device, and does not require the internet. Also, the user 
does not have to be located within a cell service area to send a text. They would simply 
hit ‘send’ and then as soon as the mobile phone enters a service area, the text is 
automatically pushed through. This technology enables users in the most remote areas of 
the DRC and CAR to effectively communicate vital information about the LRA and other 
militia groups whereabouts. The scope of communication is widened with the 
introduction of this platform because anyone would be able to contribute to their 
knowledge in the effort to stop attacks.  
                                                 
96. "Short Code", En.Wikipedia.Org, 2018, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Short_code.  Short codes, or short numbers, are short digit 
sequences, significantly shorter than telephone numbers, that are used to address 
messages in the Multimedia Messaging System (MMS) and short message service (SMS) 
systems of mobile network operators. 
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 Information gathering (crowdsourcing), however, is only half of the strategy. The 
other part relies on two-way communication, meaning that anyone who sends information 
can also opt-in to receive alerts. The platform is built so that users will be asked if they 
want to subscribe to receive information from Invisible Children about potential LRA 
attacks and raids. If they opt-in, their phone numbers will be sorted into a database that 
Invisible Children can then use to send a mass text message with information that they 
deem credible and pertinent.  
 As with their current system, IC will have the task of vetting the information they 
receive from this network for accuracy. The threshold of receiving inaccurate, false, or 
misleading data will be much higher once the network allows for any person to submit 
information—not just the highly-trained and trusted Community Observers. Although 
this particular project does not go into explicit detail about how to efficiently analyze the 
data, there are many software programs available to NGOs to assist in quick data analysis 
using algorithms and mathematics to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ information.97 
I will discuss more about the potential risks of verifying crowdsourced data in the 
subsequent sections. Another potential roadblock I will examine is how to communicate 
the existence of this platform in an easy-to-understand way, across multiple languages, 
and through a variety of cultural lenses to all mobile-phone holding citizens in LRA-
affected communities in the DRC and CAR. But first, I would like to explain why—if 
this method has such potential for positive change—it has not been implemented by 
Invisible Children already.       
                                                 
97. Anwaar Ali et al., "Big Data For Development: Applications And 
Techniques", Big Data Analytics 1, no. 1 (2016), 1-24. doi:10.1186/s41044-016-0002-4. 
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         There are now enough mobile phone users to be able to provide consistent 
information to Invisible Children and potentially other humanitarian organizations 
seeking to prevent child abductions. The platform is designed so that it is replicable, 
scalable, translatable to other fields. It is my hope that this platform will be integrated 
with the Invisible Children early warning system to increase the efficiency and scope of 
the network with the goal of preparing these communities to better handle the threat of 
violence imposed by the LRA militia raids.  
4. b. Case Study Comparison & Rationale 
 To better understand some of the strengths my platform, the potential ease of 
replication, and to identify potential weaknesses, I conducted a case study comparison 
between similar community initiatives that have been deployed in other developing 
countries that utilize SMS-based early warning systems. In an effort to create an effective 
product for ending child abductions in this region of Africa, I analyzed monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E) reports for six of the largest and most applicable community-based, 
mobile phone platforms for conflict prevention and peace building: I Paid A Bribe; ABA 
ROLI Early Warning and Response System; Counter - Lord's Resistance Army Early 
Warning System (C-LRA EWS); IPDU/P4P SMS Early Warning Early Response 
(EWER); and Belun Early Warning Early Response (EWER) (see Appendix 2). These 
M&E reports provided useful information on what aspects of these programs are working 
well and what improvements need to be made in order to achieve the desired impact. 
Although these systems are diverse and range from anti-corruption and ending sexual 
abuse impunity, they are all relatively similar in their methodologies—most notably 
through the use of citizens to engage where they previously could not. Below, I will 
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examine some of these platforms’ strengths and weaknesses to provide rationale for why 
I chose the methodologies used in the AuCourant system. 
4. b. i. Analysis 
I Paid A Bribe, which operates in India, is the world’s largest online crowd-
sourced anti-corruption platform.98 This system claims to “tackle corruption by 
harnessing the collective energy of citizens…[by] collect[ing] bribe reports, and 
build[ing] a repository of corruption-related data across government departments.”99 The 
data collected on bribe reports from anonymous users allows advocacy groups to reveal 
flaws in governance procedures and campaigns for tighter law enforcement and 
regulation thereby “reducing the scope for corruption.”100 Although widely praised for its 
ability to raise awareness of governmental corruption, I Paid A Bribe has run into a few 
issues such as difficulty in measuring the effectiveness of the platform (essentially it is 
hard to measure changes in the behavior of government officials) and how to generate 
and sustain interest in the platform since it is being funded mainly by a single entity.101  
We can learn from this model by developing AuCourant to run sustainably 
through partnerships with funding agencies and other non-profits. Catholic Relief 
Services which operates out of Uganda is well-known for funding similar projects that 
seek to end violence inflicted by the LRA. I would recommend that the AuCourant 
                                                 
98. "I Paid A Bribe", ipaidabribe.com, accessed 29 January 2018, 
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100 Ibid., 5. 
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implementing organization seek funding from CRS and establish a partnership to ensure 
future financial sustainability. Although I Paid A Bribe is hard to evaluate because 
corruption is a more abstract threat than the physical violence carried out by the LRA 
militia, the main takeaway is that an emphasis should be placed on installing proper 
evaluation methods to measure the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of the AuCourant 
system once it is in place. M&E reports conducted by third-party field monitors will 
provide invaluable feedback as to the effect this system will be having on the 
communities in which it operates. We will be able to assess the positive or negative 
outcomes as a result of the crowdsourced data and alter the platform and processes as 
necessary to create a better system.  
 There are also lessons to be learned from similar platforms that currently operate 
in DRC which have similar aims of seeking to end the violence caused by the LRA. The 
American Bar Association’s Rule of Law Initiative created an Early Warning and 
Response System (ROLI EWRS) as a way to bring justice to remote communities 
affected by the LRA. This initiative provides innovative mobile courts which allow 
victims to have their testimonies heard and also provides judicial scholarships to female 
law students.102 Similar to AuCourant, this platform gathers data on LRA incidents and 
sends alerts to communities when there is a perceived threat; however, ROLI EWRS has 
a couple major weaknesses that undermine its mission. This system relies solely on data 
gathered from trained Community Observers that live in 30 villages throughout the DRC. 
                                                 
102. "Democratic Republic Of Congo | Rule Of Law Initiative", 
Americanbar.Org, 2018, 
https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/rule_of_law/where_we_work/africa/democratic_r
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Instead of crowdsourcing information from civilians, ROLI EWRS relies on the small 
amount of information gathered from these Community Observers alone. In addition to 
the limited number of people submitting information to the network, there is also the 
issue of limited scope. These are the only 30 people who are responsible for alerting 
thousands of civilians about a potential raid when they receive an alert. This slows the 
process of evacuation and puts the community at a disadvantage. And finally, ABA ROLI 
works closely with the Congolese police force, providing them with all of the information 
gathered from the Community Observers.103 The Congolese police force and national 
army in the DRC have been accused of grave violations against children and corruption, 
making them unreliable partners in the effort to combat the LRA.104 AuCourant will have 
a much wider scope and range since it will open access to all mobile phone users instead 
of a small number of Community Observers. AuCourant will also house the 
crowdsourced data within the confines of the partner organization and will not grant 
access to potentially corrupt government or police entities.  
 Another initiative that seeks to end LRA child abductions is the USAID-run 
platform called Counter-LRA Early Warning System (C-LRA EWS). Although this 
program offers valuable assistance to LRA-affected communities in DRC and CAR, such 
as trauma healing workshops for survivors and victims, this platform again falls short of 
scope as it only uses a limited number of high-frequency radios and volunteer Conflict 
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Monitors to gather information and disseminate warnings.105 And arguably even more 
discouraging is the fact that U.S. government money is being funneled into this program, 
and along with it, political consequences. A 2015 congressional report questions whether 
U.S. fiscal support may have “unintended consequences for U.S. policy and the region” 
and “may also impede U.S. diplomatic leverage with regard to criticizing Uganda’s 
record on democracy, governance, and human rights.”106 It is for this reason that 
AuCourant would only be implemented by a non-governmental agency—to avoid the 
politics that go hand-in-hand with managing government funded programs.  
 There are also lessons to be learned from reading M&E reports on the last two 
early warning and response programs: IPDU/P4P SMS Early Warning Early Response 
(EWER) and Belun Early Warning Early Response (EWER). Although these programs 
operate in Nigeria and Timor-Leste, respectively, the evaluations provide some 
interesting perspective on the pros and cons of conflict prevention using mobile phone 
technology. Unlike the previously discussed initiatives, these platforms do engage with 
the community by allowing individuals to submit information via text messaging. There 
has been proven success with this kind of community engagement and empowerment. 
For instance, between April to June 2016, over 160 incidents were reported to the IPDU 
SMS Platform, allowing law enforcement officials to follow up on reports of violence 
and protect citizens.107 However, here we see the same issue as the C-LRA EWS system 
                                                 
105. "COUNTER - Lord's Resistance Army". 
106. Congressional Research Service, "The Lord’s Resistance Army: The U.S. 
Response", 18 (repr., CRS, 2015), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42094.pdf. 
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as the IPDU platform also partners with local law enforcement and government forces. In 
Nigeria, some have suggested that the IPDU system is “weak and inadequate” due to a 
lack of coordination between policymakers, civil society, government forces, law 
enforcement, and local actors.108 By limiting partnerships to one or two organizations, the 
AuCourant network will have more control over processes and will hopefully have a 
more organized directive.  
Evaluations of the Belun EWER platform raise concerns about a lack of resources 
to tackle the threats. Although there have been thousands of reported incidents since its 
launch in 2009, the Belun team “can barely scratch the surface of conflict resolution” due 
to a lack of internal resources and weak organization capacity.109 This is something that 
should be taken into consideration for the success of AuCourant. Also, the Belun EWER 
system faced issues with lack of awareness among senior officials about their program.110 
An evaluation of the program recommended that the team ensures that there is an 
“effective role for civil society in security sector monitoring and accountability 
systems.”111 Most importantly, AuCourant must ensure that all team members are fully 
trained on all aspects of the platform, its technical shortcomings and complexities, and 
how to engage its users so that the most positive outcome can be realized.   
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http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/257544.pdf. 
111. Ibid., 13. 
  
47 
 As shown, technology-driven conflict and corruption prevention initiatives are 
multi-faceted and complex. As with any humanitarian or advocacy mission, the 
individuals operating the AuCourant network must put forth extreme diligence and 
critical consideration in all aspects of this program in order to protect citizens and prevent 
child abductions. Hopefully these case studies illuminated some of the most important 
aspects for consideration in the deployment of this cutting-edge conflict prevention 
system. Now, I turn to the technological elements of the platform that will give 
individuals living in remote areas of the DRC and CAR the agency they desire and 
deserve.  
 
5. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 
5. a. Technical Interface 
After I selected the qualitative methodologies for the platform based on case study 
comparisons, the next challenge was to choose a technology interface that would allow 
this methodology to be fully realized. I found that although technologically-driven 
conflict prevention is a relatively new field, hundreds of previously created systems could 
simply be modified to meet the needs of this burgeoning industry. The same text 
messaging platforms that are used by school districts in Minnesota to alerts parents about 
snow days can be easily adjusted to allow for healthcare professionals in Sierra Leone to 
alert villagers about possible malaria outbreaks. As the market for these technologies 
expands to the realm of conflict prevention, the companies behind their creation are 
suddenly becoming very competitive and accessible to once-untapped clients such as 
national governments, humanitarian organizations, healthcare agencies, and NGOs. 
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Therefore, it was relatively simple to research the most widely used text messaging 
platforms and compare the benefits of each system to determine the one I ultimately 
selected.  
There are two routes to go when thinking about which type of technology to use: 
a basic, interactive SMS text-messaging platform or a more robust disaster management 
software. The advantages of disaster management software, such as Ushahidi, InSTEDD, 
and Sahana, are that more specific data can be collected to address large-scale violence 
like civil war, election fraud, and natural disasters. These programs use GPS-location 
technology and can interface with other systems so that information is streamlined from 
one platform to another. There are also other benefits in the way of data visualization—
the software can easily plot records on a map and show the user where incidents are 
occurring or being reported at a glance. Despite these advantages, I did not select this 
type of software because I felt that the technology was too complex and unnecessarily 
robust for my goal of gathering crowdsourced data and disseminating alerts to 
individuals. Also, the monthly cost for these types of platforms were much higher than 
the systems offering SMS services alone. Therefore, I chose to build my data collection 
platform with an SMS service.  
 My initial research on SMS platforms specifically tailored for international 
development yielded these three products: Frontline SMS, Open Data Kit, and Magpi. All 
three products were either open source, meaning it is publicly available and free for all 
users, or they provided a free version that would meet the needs of AuCourant. I quickly 
eliminated Frontline SMS because it did not offer text services outside of the US and 
Canada. Open Data Kit seemed like an excellent choice, however, the product only runs 
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on Android phones and I wanted the systems to be more accessible to users of all mobile 
phone types. Magpi was the clear winner as it offers advanced mobile data, messaging, 
and visualization on any mobile device in the world. The other benefits for selecting this 
product are as follows:  
• The ‘interactive’ SMS (or iSMS) technology allows for two-way 
communication with a user and a form design allows for different 
responses depending on user input. 
• It can send SMS messages to multiple users from a web-based 
platform 
• A short code allows users to initiate text sessions without being 
prompted (thus, allowing for crowdsourcing) 
• Critical data can be fed into SQL databases, Salesforce accounts, 
Google spreadsheets, or almost any other web-accessible system 
• There is an app-based feature that can run on iOS, Android, and 
Symbian phones and tablets 
• Voice based (IVR) technology allows users to speak into their phones 
instead of typing—thereby connecting with even illiterate populations 
• And a text message can be sent outside of service areas and will be 
pushed through as soon as the mobile user regains service allowing 
this service to operate well in remote areas of the world that lack 
abundant telecom infrastructure112 
I have also read several case studies which illustrated the multifaceted uses for 
this software in development work such as responding to disease outbreaks, helping 
predict natural disasters, and monitoring human rights abuses in developing countries. 
And due to the sensitive nature of the data collection for some of these use-cases, Magpi 
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ensures the security of the information collected through modern full-device encryption 
methods using a robust security profile. Therefore, I decided to use the Magpi software to 
carry out the AuCourant messaging system.  
Though I have previously described in detail the weaknesses of other systems in 
both the qualitative and technical senses—and how AuCourant will attempt to avoid 
making similar mistakes, there are some obvious potential limitations and risks of this 
system that are unavoidable given the nature of its function. Below I will delve into the 
most important areas for consideration. Specifically, I will cover how AuCourant will 
attempt to mitigate issues with data verification, spreading awareness about the program, 
the platform’s intent, and how it will communicate with users about safety.  
5. b. Data Verification  
The ubiquity of mobile telephony on the global landscape has paved the way for 
new modes of peacebuilding, security, and conflict prevention in remotes areas of the 
world. The use of technology is becoming increasingly more common in the field of 
development as it allows for more data to be efficiently collected and disseminated. 
However, this data is only as good as it is factual. The information sourced from the 
communities using AuCourant will need to be thoroughly evaluated in order for the 
platform to be effective in raid prediction. What if there are false reports of attacks sent in 
by users in an attempt to undermine the effort? What is LRA members themselves send 
in false information as a way to redirect attention away from them? What if witnesses 
submit information accidentally or provide a completely inaccurate account? In 
crowdsourcing, there are always many possible avenues for erroneous data.  
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There are several methods to verify the validity of the crowdsourced data 
including but not limited to: digital algorithms which sort and filter data; comparison 
with media to cross-reference incidents that were reported on; local Field Monitors who 
enter communities and corroborate reports with residents and possible witnesses; using 
GPS stamps to cluster incidents in order to ascertain patterns and sort out unverified 
reports. Although there are many pros and cons to all of these methods, I recommend 
implementing as many of them as possible to procure the most accurate and least-biased 
data as possible. And though this study does not delve into the mechanics of these 
methods, I would also recommend that the implementing agency places a high emphasis 
on digital algorithms which use smart machine computing methods to parse out the 
“actionable knowledge” (true information) from false data.113 Several experts in the field 
of artificial intelligence and machine learning have lauded the ability of these 
applications to successfully produce indicators from big data sets that assist in 
development—such as in humanitarian crises and violence conflicts.114 As the AuCourant 
system gathers more data as it expands into other communities, it will become even more 
important to install data verification systems that accurately vet the information being 
collected for the safety of the citizens.  
It should be noted that the feasibility of using machine learning programs to 
anticipate the likelihood of raids may be low. In terms of cost, time, and personnel, this 
may not be within the scope of reality for NGOs operating on tight budgets—as they 
often are. It is realistic, however, to anticipate that the accessibility of such programs will 
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become more available in the future as industries continue to pursue this technology as 
more practical uses emerge. It is also plausible that more money in the future might be 
earmarked for the installation of technological applications in the non-profit world as 
these systems become better at problem-solving and more cost-effective than human 
performance alone. 
5. c. Awareness, Intent, & Safety 
I foresee the most evident initial hurdle in this implementation being how to 
properly inform the communities about the conceptual and logistical realities of 
AuCourant. The first issue is how to effectively communicate the AuCourant short code, 
the system’s main objective, and what the user should across many cultural, linguistic, 
and situational barriers. I have worked with a skilled graphic designer to create a few 
mock-ups of potential advertisements that could be made into physical posters or used in 
billboards (see Appendix 1.e.). The main objective with these posters is to have a visual 
impact that will be able to communicate to the user that this is a text-message based 
initiative used to anonymously report LRA activity in order to stop the forced 
conscription of children. We included the ‘down the barrel of the gun’ aesthetic and 
silhouette of a child soldier enshrouded in red to communicate to even an illiterate 
audience that the nature of AuCourant concentrates on CAC. The ad mockup is currently 
in English but if and when the system is deployed in CAR and DRC, the copy would be 
translated into French and some of the main local dialects such as Kiswahili, Sango, and 
the Bantu language Lingala. The ad clearly states that community members should text 
282-687 to report any LRA activity they witness and include the date, time, and any other 
pertinent information. It also communicates that the user can choose to voluntarily enroll 
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in a subscription service to receive texts about LRA activity or perceived threats in their 
area. The target population can also be reached via radio advertisements, community 
billboards, paper handouts in villages, and TV advertisements, to name a few. 
Although it is important to properly convey what AuCourant is, it is arguably 
more important to communicate to users what is is not. It will be crucial to the success of 
the program, and the safety of the community, to ensure that we communicate to the 
public that this is not a 911 service. Users should be fully aware that they are simply 
contributing data that will help the experts predict outbreaks of violence, but that citizens 
should not rely on receiving an alert notification. As with any conflict, there will be 
surprise attacks and unplanned raids that AuCourant will not be able to detect. It is also 
vital that the user understands that no emergency services nor police will be deployed 
when an alert is sent. The purpose of the alert is to trigger community members to follow 
through with a predetermined evacuation plan or whatever protocol the village leaders 
decide. We can learn from past mistakes made with the Ushahidi program where users 
expected a response when a notification was sent. The following excerpt comes from a 
TechChange article warning of the perils of mobile phone technology in conflict 
prevention: 
There were cases where people thought that sending a text to Ushahidi 
was like calling 911. They expected that if their text showed up on a map, 
then help would come,” said Dr. Levinger. It’s incumbent on outsiders to 
make it clear what their technology’s purpose is and what its limits are. 
This is important in the best of circumstances, but in an emergency it can 
be the difference between life and death.115 
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With this in mind, proper attention must be given to effectively communicate 
AuCourant’s conceptual intent and purpose to the public through the ad campaigns. The 
ads will also inform the user that the program is free and anonymous to use but that does 
not mean there are no risks. For instance, if the user subscribes to the service, they will 
receive a text notification which may sound on phones at the same time as other 
subscribers—an observer may be able to connect the dots that the user was subscribed 
and that they are receiving alerts. This is one of many potential indicators that a user has 
subscribed, and that may prove to be dangerous depending on the situation. This is a 
threat that the user must understand before they engage with the platform.  
5. d. Other Limitations & Risks  
The overseeing body of AuCourant, be it Invisible Children or another 
organization, will have challenges to overcome if this system is to work effectively to 
prevent child abductions. With any newly implemented technology, there are certain 
unique challenges that must be addressed in order for the system to carry out the specific 
function for which it was created. However, the precarious nature of the threat that this 
system seeks to eradicate—an unstable, child-abducting armed militia—should not be 
understated. The kind of information being disseminated through AuCourant has 
powerful implications—both for transformative social improvement but also for 
potentially dangerous effects on the community in which it operates unless special care 
and diligent thought are put into the management of this system. In the previous sections 
I have attempted to predict a few of the most critical aspects of this system that are 
potential areas of weakness, risks, or possible limitations in the implementation of 
AuCourant—however it is by no means an exhaustive list of the potential risks. I believe 
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the most prudent process for unrolling this platform would be in a small beta-test in two 
villages in DRC and CAR, respectively, to monitor the strengths and weakness on small 
scale before it is deployed country-wide.  
5. e. Beta-Testing 
It is always a good idea to launch a small-scale version of a project, beta-test, to 
receive feedback that could be useful in altering the platform before resources are used to 
implement the full-scale platform. Not only is beta-testing useful for altering the 
technical aspects of the platform, it is also crucial for receiving feedback from the 
community in which it will be released. Perhaps there is some aspect that was overlooked 
in the development stages—this is the opportunity to fix those bugs before the project 
goes live to thousands of people. And the detailed feedback from the users of the product 
will be helpful for tweaking aspects of the product that do not make sense for users. It is 
ultimately a chance to refine the platform before launching in the hopes of maximizing its 
ultimate success.  
Beta-testing the AuCourant platform could be achieved by deploying the program 
in two villages in DRC and CAR prior to rolling out the system to millions of people. 
Information on which two communities to choose could best be answered by local actors, 
therefore I will not presume to know where this system should be piloted. However, it 
should be assumed that these two areas are LRA-affected and have proven mobile phone 
users to make it an effective trial. Ad campaigns should be presented in these 
communities and the data collected should be thoroughly monitored for accuracy. After a 
period of three to six months, M&E specialists should conduct full reports on the 
effectiveness of the ads, ability for the system to function, and other limitations or 
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successes. This information will be paramount to the success of the program when it is 
launched on a large scale across DRC and CAR. 
6. CONCLUSION 
If judiciously executed, the AuCourant platform has the ability to provide life-
changing outcomes for individuals who had never been able to demonstrate agency in the 
past. For those parents of children in LRA-affected areas of the DRC and CAR, the 
power of protection may literally exist in their pocket—by harnessing the far-reaching 
power of mobile phone SMS technology, the AuCourant network could transform the 
landscape from one to violence to one of peace. The balance of power which currently 
resides with the LRA could shift to the residents, emboldening them with the ability to 
save themselves and their children from a lifetime of trauma and bloodshed. 
However, as with any idea that asserts life-changing results, it should be 
cautioned that this is not a silver bullet. This is simply one suggestion for making a 
current system more effective in the fight against the use of children in combat. Dr. Raul 
Zambrano of the United Nations Development Program and Dr. Matthew Levinger from 
the U.S. Institute of Peace eloquently assert that “the challenges faced by development 
and peace-making professionals can only be solved by human ingenuity, social awareness 
and ethics. Mobile technology is only a means to more efficiently achieving this end.”116 
If humanitarians, governments, and child rights advocates are serious about changing the 
tide of abuse and abduction in these countries, they cannot solely rely on technology to 
make this change; it will require the dedication, hard work, and perseverance of these 
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impassioned individuals to see that this technology fulfills the transformation they so 
desire.   
I cannot help but think back to my few weeks in that Uganda refugee camp where 
my initial desire to help originated. Although I am realistic about the barriers facing this 
kind of innovative method, I am also extremely hopeful and motivated by the potential 
this project possesses. This platform has far-reaching capabilities to transform 
communities in areas of the world that have been ‘forgotten’ or are so remote that 
collaboration with outside assistance is difficult. It also gives the power back to the 
individuals who were previously regarded as only victims; now they will have the agency 
to fight back against the violence by being more prepared for when disaster strikes. 
Knowledge is power—and this power has the potential to improve the lives of millions 
and most importantly, the lives of the next generation.  
I was recently approached by a Congolese citizen studying in the United States 
about my work on this platform. He confided that his own life was saved when he was 
alerted about an incoming militia raid on his village before it happened. He was warned 
about the impending raid through a ‘traditional’ method where a scout would perch on a 
hilltop and if he spotted danger, he would yell and pound on drums to signal incoming 
danger to the villagers below. He also disclosed to me that he was excited about the 
potential impact of my platform and, in his personal opinion, thought that it would work 
well to save lives in DRC.  
Whether or not this platform is implemented in the field, I will continue to ‘sound 
the drums,’ so-to-speak, and do whatever is in my ability to prevent the needless 
suffering of children in the future. I am honored by those who bravely shared their stories 
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with me, humbled by the fierce determination of the survivors, and driven by my promise 
to bring hope to an area ravaged by decades of brutality. I am very grateful that I have 
had the opportunity to contribute to the research on this topic and provide my idea to the 
growing movement of advocates fighting to keep children safe from the dangers of armed 
conflict around the world.  
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2. CASE STUDY COMPARISON CHART 
 
 
Program Name
Implementing 
Agency
Stakeholder(s)
/Partners
Threat
Geographic 
Region
Methodology Strengths Weaknesses
I Paid A Bribe Janaagraha
OECD 
Development 
Assistance 
Committee
Government 
Corruption
India
• Largest online crowd-sourced 
anti- corruption platform in the 
world today
• Crowd-sourcing model to 
collect bribe reports
• Repository of corruption-
related data across government 
departments
• Data on corruption builds awareness and 
shame, raising the cost of corruption.
• Leaverages technology to decrease 
corruption in government.
• Difficult to measure effectiveness of 
platform (behavior changes).
• After initial successes in 2011, traffic to 
the website has slowed.
• How to generate and sustain interest in 
the web platform so that they have real 
impact on corruption in India.
ABA ROLI Early 
Warning and 
Response 
System
American Bar 
Association, 
Rule of Law 
Initiative (ROLI)
Congolese 
Police and 
National Army
Rape/Serious 
Crimes
DRC
• Free legal aid and mobile 
courts to meet the needs of 
those in remote areas
• Scholarship and externship 
opportunities for female law 
students
• Helps to build the justice system’s ability to 
manage, analyze and use data to improve the 
delivery of justice.
• Uses simple yet powerful technology to 
increase access to justice, connect the various 
actors within the justice system to avert 
violence.
• Empowers community leaders to advocate 
on behalf of communities affected by large-
scale mining.
• Information routed directly to 
Congolese police force and national army 
which have been accused of grave 
violations against children and corruption.
Counter - Lord's 
Resistance 
Army Early 
Warning 
System (C-LRA 
EWS)
USAID
Catholic Relief 
Services
LRA 
Attacks/Raids
Northeast DRC   
& CAR
• Communities use high 
frequency radios and other 
technologies to report LRA 
activities and exchange critical 
information enabling them to 
reduce their exposure to attack
• Communities can organize 
their own protection plans and 
provides trauma- healing 
support for survivors of LRA 
attacks
• Over 281,000 beneficiaries in CAR and DRC.
• Formed 94 community protection 
committees (32 in CAR, 62 in DRC) that help 
local populations mitigate the impacts of 
attacks.
• Operates high-frequency radios in 38 
communities in CAR and 62 communities in 
DRC using solar panels to expand 
dissemination of information on LRA attacks.
• Held more than 123 trauma healing 
workshops in the DRC and CAR.
• Trained 538 volunteer conflict monitors 
across Northern Uganda.
• Only 30 members have ability to 
send/receive texts.
• Some might question whether ongoing 
U.S. support to the Ugandan military is 
having unintended consequences for U.S. 
policy and the region, for example in 
relation to Uganda’s military role in the 
internal conflict in South Sudan.
• The U.S. security partnership with the 
UPDF may also impede U.S. diplomatic 
leverage with regard to criticizing 
Uganda’s record on democracy, 
governance, and human rights.
IPDU/P4P SMS 
Early Warning 
Early Response 
(EWER)
Partnership 
Initiative in the 
Niger Delta 
(IPDU); 
Partners4Peace 
(P4P); The Fund 
for Peace
Law 
enforcement 
agencies
Conflict 
Management 
and Peace- 
building
Niger Delta 
Region
• SMS-Based Early Warning & 
Response System and peace 
messaging online platform 
collects, collates and analyzes 
conflict incidents and aids law 
enforcement agencies
• Enables PREVENT Committee Members and 
other trained field monitors to send in regular 
reports that are integrated into monthly 
trackers along with other data sources.
• Between April-June, 2016, over 160 
incidents were reported to the IPDU SMS 
Platform.
• In Nigeria, peacebuilding stakeholders' 
responses to early warning signals are 
weak and inadequate due a to lack of 
coordination between major 
stakeholders, policymakers, civil society 
and local actors. 
• There is an urgent need to develop 
conflict prevention and management 
mechanisms to enhance political 
stability, peace and human security in 
Nigeria.
Belun Early 
Warning Early 
Response 
(EWER)
Belun
The Secretary of 
State for 
Security; 
Colombia 
University
"Conflict" Timor-Leste
• Alerts are released when 
incidents or trends of serious 
concern are recorded by the 
EWER monitoring system
• Monthly situation reviews summarize the 
most notable incidents and trends recorded 
by the EWER monitoring system and present 
a graphical review of all incidents recorded 
each month.
• Conflict Potential Analysis Reports review 
EWER data over a longer period (4 months to 
1 year) to better identify long-term trends 
and changes to the security situation at the 
sub-district, district and national levels.
• Resources; with thousands of disputes 
reported since 2009, the Belun team can 
barely scratch the surface of conflict 
resolution.
• Need to strengthen organizational 
capacity for Belun and FM. These 
national NGOs still need support in 
institutional development and 
management information systems  
(MIS).
